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Are “Smart Choices” a “Bad Decision”?
Self-Regulation in the Food
Industry
Nicole Hamberger
nicole.hamberger@gmail.com

Lucky Charms, Froot Loops, Ritz
Bits Peanut Butter Chocolatey Blast
Crackers—historically, children had to
persuade hesitant parents to put these
items in the grocery cart.1 Today, these
and many other sugary, highly processed
foods are granted the coveted “Smart
Choices” check mark, indicating to consumers that they have made a nutritious
food choice.2 But whose standards indicate whether or not food options are
“smart”?
“Smart Choices” products are selfregulated by the Smart Choices Program
(SCP). Many individuals and entities
alike, however, question the merit of the
SCP and worry that misrepresentation
and misconceptions arise from labeling

certain products Smart Choices. They ask
whether alternative regulatory measures by
the government may, in fact, be more appropriate.
The Origins and Details of Smart
Choices Self-Regulation
In 2006, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health and
Human Services recommended that food
companies “explore labeling initiatives,
including icons and seals, to identify lowercalorie, nutritious foods clearly and in a
manner that does not mislead consumers.”3 In response, many companies began
self-regulating their products, but their
standards and symbols were not uniform.
In 2007, the Keystone Center, a nonprofit
health group, recognized this national issue
of labeling confusion and assembled a
Food and Nutrition Roundtable to
“explore science-based nutrition labeling
solutions to help improve the American
diet and enhance public health.”4 This

Roundtable consisted of a coalition of
different organizations and individuals,
including scientists, academics, health and
research organizations, food manufacturers, and retailers.5 At this Roundtable, the
idea of making the “Nutrition Facts panel
more relevant and meaningful to consumers emerged as a topic of focus.”6 Discussing this concept “led to a discussion
of front-of-pack (FOP) nutrition labeling
and the need for a uniform FOP nutrition
labeling program to help bring consistency
and clarity to the marketplace.”7
As a result of this discussion, the
Roundtable developed the Smart Choices
name and logo.8 If a food group is approved, it receives two SCP labels: one is
“a green checkmark symbol indicating that
a food bearing the checkmark has met
certain nutrient criteria; the other states
the number of calories per serving and the
number of servings in the package.”9 The
SCP website states that “the uniform and
(‘Smart Choices,’ Continued on page 7)

Reverse Payments
clusivity period to the first generic company to file a paragraph IV certification,
blocking any other generic companies
from marketing the same drug during this
time.4 Once a paragraph IV certification
is filed, the brand company has forty-five
days to file suit against the generic for
patent infringement.5 As a benefit to the
brand company, FDA will refuse to grant
the generic company market approval of
the generic drug for thirty months starting
from the initiation of this litigation.6

A Lawful Settlement Strategy
or Unlawful Reduction in
Competition?
Nicole Ho
nicole.ho@student.shu.edu

Reverse Payments Reduce the
Drug Price Competition Intended by
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman Act) in 1984 to
help reduce the cost of pharmaceutical
drugs by encouraging the entry of generic
drugs into the market.1 Under the HatchWaxman Act, a generic drug company
may file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), which requires submission of significantly less
safety and efficacy data than is required
by a brand drug in order to get market

approval.2 Generally the generic company
must also file a paragraph IV certification
along with the ANDA, stating that it will
not infringe upon the brand company’s
patent or that the brand company’s patent
is invalid.3 FDA will grant a 180-day ex-

In the early 2000s brand and generic
companies began to use so-called “reverse
payments” as part of paragraph IV litigation settlements. Reverse payments occur
when the brand company pays the generic
company, either in money or some form
of other consideration, to delay launch of
the generic drug until shortly before the
patent expires.7 Because the brand drug
remains the only available option for con(‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued on page 10)
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Managing Pharmacy Benefit Managers
The Effect of Transparency Reform on “Big Business” and
“Small Patient”
Sarah Geers
sarah.geers@student.shu.edu

The current legislative focus on
healthcare reform has seemingly pitted
the “small patient,” who is facing everincreasing healthcare costs and perhaps a
lack of healthcare coverage altogether,1
against “big business,” a healthcare industry whose profits are apparently at the
expense of patients who depend on it for
their very wellbeing.2 In the midst of this
adversarial reform climate, one proposal
stands to benefit both sides: the addition
to current measures increasing healthcare
access of transparency requirements for
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs).
Introduction to Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (PBMs)
Pharmacy benefit managers act as a
species of “middleman” in the drug supply chain linking pharmaceutical manufacturers to patients. Specifically, PBMs
link pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmacies, and benefit providers.3 They
contract with manufacturers on behalf of
benefit providers to obtain brand name
and generic drug coverage.4 In addition,
they contract with retail or mail-order
pharmacies to provide access to these
drugs for benefit provider plan enrollees.5 PBMs managed drug benefits for
fifty-seven percent of the U.S. population in 2004.6
In negotiating these relationships,
PBMs do more than act as an intermediary; they perform several other functions
that have subjected their role to scrutiny:
☼ Development of formularies,
including generic and therapeutic substitution. PBMs primarily use formularies,
or lists of PBM-approved drugs, to manage benefits for benefit providers.7 In
effect, PBMs will rank available prescription drugs by desirability, with some ex-

cluded altogether from the formulary, and
will price patient co-pays accordingly.8
Generally, PBMs utilize a three- or fourtiered co-pay arrangement, with associated
co-pays increasing in each tier: (1) generic
drugs; (2) brand-name drugs with no generic equivalents; (3) brand-name drugs
with generic equivalents; and (4) optionally, as negotiated by the benefit provider
plan, drugs excluded from the formulary,
such as lifestyle drugs.9 In addition to
saying “yes” or “no” to a particular pharmaceutical treatment option and setting
the patient price accordingly, PBMs also
exercise considerable power over how a
pharmacy fills a particular individual prescription.10 PBMs can direct pharmacies
to substitute generic versions of drugs for
brand-name prescriptions, without needing physician approval, or to substitute
therapeutically distinct but equivalent (and
likely less expensive) drugs, subject to
physician authorization.11 By providing
significant “pocketbook” incentives for
patients filling pharmacy prescriptions to
switch to less expensive alternatives,
PBMs manage the costs of the benefit
providers’ prescription benefits.
☼ Negotiation of rebates and downstream payments. PBMs also negotiate
payment streams with pharmaceutical
manufacturers, retail pharmacies, and
benefit providers. First, PBMs negotiate
with pharmaceutical manufacturers for
“rebates” of portions of the Average
Wholesale Price (AWP)—the “sticker

price”—for drugs included on a PBM’s
formulary. The PBM will negotiate an
AWP rebate based on “(a) a percentage of
AWP or some other wholesale benchmark, (b) achieving certain specified sales
or market share targets, (c) preferred
placement of certain drug products on the
PBM[’s] formulary,” or a combination of
these.12 The PBM will also incorporate
AWP rebates into its agreements with
pharmacies and the benefit providers. For
example, the PBM will reimburse the
pharmacy at a price that reduces AWP by
some rebate, offset by a dispensing fee,
e.g., “AWP minus % rebate plus $ dispensing fee.”13 The size of this rebate will
depend in part on the exclusivity of the
relationship (i.e., the size of the resulting
retail pharmacy network) and the number
of benefit providers associated with the
PBM.14 With respect to the benefit providers, the PBM will pass along some of
these rebates but incorporate an additional
administration charge to cover other services the PBM provides, e.g., “AWP minus
% rebate plus $ administration fee.”15
Each of these fee structures are negotiated
separately with each entity, and rebates are
not currently disclosed.16
☼ Other functions: Mail-order services, claims adjudication, and qualityfocused programs. In addition to these
primary functions, PBMs also provide
ancillary services to benefit providers and
patients. Most PBMs offer mail-order
(‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued on page 12)
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The rebate and payment negotiation relationships among PBMs, pharmaceutical manufacturers, benefit providers, pharmacies, and consumers.
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Pregnant with Power
Court Takes Control in the OTC
Switch of Plan B
Diana Giampiccolo
diana.giampiccolo@student.shu.edu

The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has struggled with the question of
whether to allow the over-the-counter
sale of the Plan B emergency contraceptive to young women.1 On March 23,
2009, after six years of debate, the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York finally ordered
FDA to make Plan B available to women
age seventeen and older without a prescription.2 In a fifty-two page opinion,
Judge Edward R. Korman scolded FDA
for allowing the White House’s political
agenda to trump the scientific evidence
that clearly showed over-the-counter
Plan B to be safe for women age seventeen and over.3 Following Judge Korman’s decision, a number of religious
groups sought leave to challenge the
outcome,4 but these groups were ultimately found to lack standing to intervene.5 The disagreement over Plan B
sparks a fundamental question: is the
court’s intervention in ordering drug
regulations appropriate when scientific
findings and political agendas collide?

“[I]S

THE

INTERVENTION
D R U G

COURT
IN

’S

ORDERING

R E G U L A T I O N S

APPROPRIATE WHEN SCIENTIFIC
FINDINGS

AND

POLITICAL

AGENDAS COLLIDE?

”

Plan B, commonly known as the
“morning-after pill,” is a type of contraception that is taken after sexual intercourse to prevent unwanted pregnancy.6
Initially, the drug was available only by
prescription.7 In August 2006, however,
FDA approved the switch to nonprescription use of Plan B for women
eighteen and over, which allowed women
to obtain Plan B upon consultation with
a pharmacist, also known as “behind the
counter” (BTC).8 Judge Korman’s ruling

did not alter the BTC requirements, but
simply lowered the minimum age for obtaining the drug from eighteen to seventeen.9

On February 14, 2001, a Citizen Petition
was submitted to FDA asking for a complete OTC switch of Plan B without age
restrictions.20 Although FDA recognized
that there was sufficient data to approve

The Role of FDA Generally
The public relies on FDA to make
informed decisions about drug regulations. The basis for these decisions is
codified in 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)—
to protect and promote the public
health.10 But, despite their efforts to remain a neutral body, FDA faced pressure
from the White House and from certain
religious groups to deny making Plan B
available without a prescription.11 Thus,
given the highly sensitive nature of emergency contraception, FDA veered sharply
away from its normal procedure.12
Before the implementation of the
BTC regime, drugs were either available
by prescription or over the counter
(OTC).13 FDA has distinct protocol in
place for all prescription-to-OTC switches
to ensure that the scientific evidence is
evaluated objectively.14 According to the
FDCA, a drug can be sold without a prescription when the Secretary of Health
and Human Services finds that a prescription requirement is not necessary for the
protection of public health.15 The switch
can occur either by a regulation promulgated by FDA at the request of FDA
commissioner or of an interested citizen,
or alternatively, a drug sponsor can request a switch, whereby rulemaking is
unnecessary.16 The Commissioner may
also delegate the switch operations to
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER).17 The Director of the
CDER will seek the help of agencies
within its control and advice from outside
experts and has the ultimate decision of
whether to approve a switch.18
The Role of FDA—and the Court—
in the Plan B Switch
As Judge Korman outlines in his
opinion, politics and protocol collided in
the Plan B switch recommendations.19

the switch, then-FDA Deputy Commissioner Dr. Lester Crawford and Commissioner Dr. Mark McClellan later testified
that at the time, discussions regarding the
“political sensitivity” of the possible
switch of Plan B pervaded the decision
process.21 Judge Korman notes that testimony of FDA officials reveals that politics
and ideology played a “determinative role”
in choosing members for the advisory
committee that would ultimately decide
whether to approve the Plan B switch.22
The Advisory Committee nonetheless
approved the Plan B switch.23 The FDA,
however, did not follow its advice.24
Judge Korman points out that “the FDA
has followed advisory committee recommendations in every OTC switch application in the last decade.”25 Judge Korman
further references similar occurrences
within FDA over the subsequent five
years, which indicated that the agency
continued to deviate from its routine protocol.26 Even when the drug was made
available for OTC use to women eighteen
and over, it was still placed behind the
pharmacy counter, so that women who
purchased the drug were monitored.27
(‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued on page 9)
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To Tell or Not to Tell—That Is the Question
Physician Disclosure of Medical
Errors
Neelu Pal
neelupal@hotmail.com

Imagine this scenario: a patient visits
the hospital and undergoes a cardiac
procedure. He is discharged a few days
later. He continues to have some difficulties, and his cardiologist does an outpatient echo-cardiogram, which reveals a
collection of blood adjacent to the heart.
The patient is brought back to the operating room, where a small incision is
made below the xiphoid process and a
catheter advanced in an attempt to
“suction” out this blood. Massive bleeding is encountered and the patient expires on the operating room table.
What should the physician tell the
patient’s wife and daughter who are in
the waiting room?
New Jersey’s Patient Safety Act
(PSA),1

The Patient Safety Act
a
landmark piece of legislation passed in
2004, changed the paradigm for dealing
with medical errors and serious adverse
events in New Jersey. Previously limited
to an ethical responsibility, the legislation
created a legal duty to disclose medical
errors to patients or their surviving families in the event of death.2
The PSA falls within the rubric of
the so-called “apology laws,” which prevent the use of expressions of regret,
condolences, and sympathy from use as
evidence of admission of guilt in subsequent litigation.3 At least four other
states have mandated disclosure of mediType of Disclosure
Legally Protected
Sympathy only
Admission of fault

cal errors to patients.4 Of the fifty states
and the District of Columbia, thirty-six
have enacted “apology laws” protecting
voluntary disclosures of medical errors.5

“OF

DISOF COLUMBIA, THIRTY-SIX
ENACTED ‘APOLOGY LAWS’

THE FIFTY STATES AND THE

TRICT
HAVE

PROTECTING

VOLUNTARY

DISCLO-

SURES OF MEDICAL ERRORS.”

The PSA defines an “adverse event”
as an event that is “a negative consequence of care that results in unintended
injury or illness, which may or may not
have been preventable.”7 A “serious, preventable adverse event” is defined in the
PSA as “an adverse event that is a preventable event and results in death or loss
of a body part, or disability or loss of bodily function lasting more than seven days
or still present at the time of discharge
from a health care facility.”8
The legislature stated that its intent in
mandating disclosure of serious, preventable adverse events was to “increase the
amount of information on systems failures, analyze the sources of these failures
and disseminate information on effective
practices for reducing systems failures and
improving the safety of patients.”9 Thus,
the patient must be informed of any serious preventable adverse events before the
end of the episode of care, or in a timely
manner if the error is discovered after the
episode of care has ended.10 In addition,
the Department of Health and Senior
Services (DHSS) must be notified of the
occurrence of the error.11

Explanation6
Protects physician expressions of sympathy, regret, and
condolence
Protects physician admissions of fault and error, as well
as expressions of sympathy, regret, and condolence

In August 2006 the legislature clarified some of the ambiguous provisions of
the PSA and the penalties resulting from
non-compliance.12 Physicians or medical
providers are required to notify a patient
of a medical error within twenty-four
hours of its discovery.13 The patient must
be notified by telephone or certified mail
or in person if he is still at the facility.14
The disclosure must be documented in the
patient’s chart along with details of date,
time, the persons informed, and the
names of all individuals present at the
time the disclosure was made.15 A report
to DHSS must be made within five days
of the occurrence or discovery of the adverse event.16 Specific details that must be
included in the report to DHSS include (a)
the date and time the event occurred, (b) a
brief description of the event, (c) a statement about the impact of the event on the
health of the patient, (d) the date and time
the facility became aware of the event, (e)
how the event was discovered, (f) the immediate corrective actions the facility took
to eliminate or reduce the adverse impact
of the event on the patient, and (g) what
steps were taken to prevent the occurrence of future similar events.17
The Act penalizes non-compliance by
healthcare facilities at a rate of $1000 per
day.18 Medical providers are fined $1000
for disclosing to neither the patient nor
DHSS.19 But if there is no disclosure to
the patient, while a disclosure was made to
the Department, the fine increases to
$5000.20
An Ethical Responsibility
The American Medical Association
Code of Ethics describe the doctorpatient relationship as one that is “based
on trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare
above their own self-interest and above
obligations to other groups and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.”21 The
clinical encounter between a patient and a
doctor is described as “fundamentally a
moral activity that arises from the impera(‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued on page 7)
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‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued

Similarly, many organizations that
oversee healthcare entities support disclosure of errors and adverse events. In
2001, the Joint Commission issued the
first nationwide disclosure standard,
which required that patients be informed
about all outcomes of care, including

“unanticipated outcomes.”26 The
standard did not specify the content
of disclosure, nor did it mandate
that patients be told when unanticipated outcomes were due to error.27
In 2006, the National Quality Forum endorsed full disclosure of
“serious unanticipated outcomes” as
one of its thirty “safe practices” for
healthcare.28 In legally mandating
these standards in the form of the
PSA, the New Jersey legislature
stated that “[h]ealth care facilities
and professionals must be held accountable for serious preventable
adverse events.”29 The necessity of
a law to supplement an ethical obligation implies that the ethical imperative alone has been inadequate
in creating this accountability.

What Physicians Would Disclose about
Percent of Physicians Agreeing

tive to care for patients and to alleviate
suffering.”22 Based on the principles that
trust and patient-welfare are central to the
physician-patient relationship, the American Medical Association Code of Ethics
states that physicians have an ethical obligation to advise patients of the occurrence of a significant medical error when
“a patient suffers significant medical
complications that may have resulted
from the physician’s mistake or judgment.”23 The American College of Surgeons endorses in its Code of Professional Conduct that surgeons “fully disclose adverse events and medical errors.”24 The American College of Physicians’ Ethics Manual also directs physicians to disclose errors if disclosure of
this information is “material to the patient’s well-being.”25

60%

Error & Adverse Events (AEs) 33
56%

50%

42%

40%
30%
20%
10%

3%

0%

The Gap Between Ideals and Reality
Most patients harmed by medical errors are never told that these errors have
occurred. Interviews and surveys regarding error disclosure have shown that patients want to be informed of errors in

Partial
Disclosure
(mention AE
but not error)

Full
Disclosure
(explicit
statement
that error
occurred)

No Disclosure
(no reference
to AE or error)

their medical care, to receive an explanation of the occurrence of the errors, and
to learn how recurrences will be prevented.31 Physicians agreed with disclosure, but indicated that they “choose their
words carefully” when telling patients
about errors.32
(‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued on page 14)

‘Smart Choices,’ Continued
recognizable nutrition symbol and calorie
information that can be identified at-aglance on the front of packages can help
guide consumers’ food choices at the
point of purchase and in their homes.”10
The standards used in evaluating
SCP food items were to be derived from
“a comprehensive set of qualifying nutrition criteria derived from . . . the Dietary
Guidelines for Americans, FDA standards, reports from the Institute of Medicine and other sources of authoritative
dietary guidance.”11 First, SCP items
“must meet specific nutritional benchmarks.”12 Under this requirement, food
items may not surpass the maximum recommended amount of certain “nutrients
to limit” which include “total fat, saturated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, added
sugars and sodium.”13 For example, a
product may not contain more than

twelve grams of sugar per serving.14 Second, SCP items must “provide positive
attributes” that individuals are encouraged
to consume; these include “nutrients to
encourage,” if healthy vitamins or minerals
are contained in the item, or “food groups
to encourage,” if a
desirable
food
group can be
found in the
item.15 Examples
of “nutrients to
encourage” are
Vitamin A and
calcium; examples
of “food groups to
encourage” are
whole grains and
vegetables.16
Fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables
without any additives are automatically

deemed Smart Choices.17 However, nineteen other food categories are considered
for Smart Choices labeling by the program, including “cheese and cheese substitutes; snack foods and sweets; fats, oils
and spreads.”18 According to Marion
Nestle, Nutrition Professor at New York
University, “[t]he object of this is to make
highly processed foods appear as healthful
as unprocessed foods, which they are
not.”19
Kraft Foods, Kellogg’s, PepsiCo, and
General Mills are among the ten companies who have signed up for the SCP,
paying up to $100,000 per year to participate.20 Over two thousand products have
been deemed Smart Choices as of September 29, 2009; the expectation is that
this total will soon double.21
(‘Smart Choices,’ Continued on page 8)
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‘Smart Choices,’ Continued
Supporters of Smart Choices
Those who support Smart Choices
believe that it will aid a fast-paced society
in making better food choices “in a way
that reflects how people really shop.”22
Michael Hughes of the Smart Choices
Board states that while it might be optimal to have salad for dinner, “that’s not a
choice everyone will make.”23 Therefore,
“consumers’ desires for taste” must be
considered.24 The easily-identifiable labeling potentially allows consumers to
make efficient shopping selections that
favor healthier food choices.

Critics of Smart Choices
The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) is one organization that is skeptical of the SCP’s methodology.25 On
August 19, 2009, the FDA and Department of Agriculture sent SCP a letter,
stating their intent “to monitor and
evaluate” the SCP system due to various
concerns.26 For example, FDA consumer research found that FOP labels
make people less likely to consult back or
side labeling.27 Therefore, “both the
criteria and symbols used in [FOP] and
self-labeling systems [must] help consumers make healthy food choices.”28
The letter stated that it would focus on
evaluating whether SCP’s criteria were
“stringent enough to protect consumers
against misleading claims.”29 The letter
further stated that the groups would
monitor to see if labels “were inconsistent with the Dietary Guidelines for
Americans; or had the effect of encouraging consumers to choose highly processed foods and refined grains instead of
fruits, vegetables and whole grains.”30

Others also question the misleading
and possibly fraudulent nature of the program.31 Michael Jacobson, Executive Director of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest, once served on the Smart
Choices nutritional criteria panel.32 He
quit after realizing that the panel was
“dominated by members of the food industry, which skewed its decision.”33 Crucially, Jacobsen said that the criteria permit foods that contain added nutrients to
bear the Smart Choices seal. This “could
mask shortcomings in the food”—such as
bread made with no whole grain but with
added nutrients—that qualifies for the
Smart Choices seal.34 Jacobsen also questioned the practice of permitting Smart
Choices labels on “both regular and light
mayonnaise, which could lead consumers
to think they are both equally healthy.”35
Some question the propensity towards self-regulation in general.36 Commentators in the New England Journal of
Medicine have said that “selfregulation . . . could go far toward improving the healthfulness of foods sold”
but only if it does “not displace meaningful external regulation.”37 Furthermore,
they insisted, “some forms of communication may impede rather than facilitate
informed choices.”38
Negative press on the SCP has led to
institutions wishing to disassociate their
names from the program.39 While members who sit on the Smart Choices Board
come from the American Dietetic Association, the American Diabetes Association, and Tufts University’s School of
Nutrition, each of these institutions has
asked that Smart Choices remove their
institution’s names from its website, so as
not to be affiliated with SCP.40
Alternative Regulation: The FDA
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) of 1938 broadly delegated the
authority of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to regulate food labels to
the FDA. The FDCA permits the FDA
to regulate “any vitamin, mineral, or other
nutrient required to be placed on the label

and labeling of food under this Act . . . if
the [FDA] determines that such information will assist consumers in maintaining
healthy dietary practices.”41 Furthermore,
the FDA “may by regulation require any
information required to be placed on the
label or labeling . . . to be highlighted on
the label or labeling by larger type, bold
type, or contrasting color if the [FDA]
determines that such highlighting will
assist consumers in maintaining healthy
dietary practices.”42 The FDCA also demands that labels not be “misleading.”
To decide if labels are misleading, “there
shall be taken into account (among other
things) not only representations made or
suggested by statement, word, design,
device, or any combination thereof, but
also the extent to which the labeling or
advertising fails to reveal [material]
facts.”43 A violation of the FDCA thus
gives the FDA extensive power to correct
such mislabeling.

“THEREIN LIES ONE PROBLEM WITH
[THE SMART CHOICES PROGRAM]: A
LABEL PROVIDING ONLY CALORIC CONTENT, SERVING SIZE, AND WHETHER A
FOOD IS A GOOD SOURCE OF SOMETHING DOES NOT PROVIDE A FULL
SPECTRUM OF NUTRITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE CONSUMER.”

Therein lies one problem with SCP: a
label providing only caloric content, serving size, and whether a food is a good
source of something does not provide a full
spectrum of nutritional information to the
consumer. The SCP labels products with
added minerals as Smart Choices. Accordingly, the public may choose a food
otherwise devoid of nutrients and packed
with empty calories—its only benefit being added minerals—and may detrimentally rely on the assumption that it has
health benefits based on the SCP label.
To prevent this, a food label should be
forced to disclose that while minerals are
added to the product, so are negative
items like refined sugars. It should also
(Smart Choices,’ Continued on page 9)
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‘Smart Choices,’ Continued
disclose that there are sources by which
one can find minerals from naturally
occurring products, such as fruits, vegetables, or whole grains, that lack those
added sugars (or other negative added
items). Obviously, this much information on a FOP labeling scheme seems
impractical. But not only is it unfair to
include only the positive aspects of a
product without the whole picture of a
product, it also violates the FDCA.

“[S]ERVING

SIZE

SHOULD

BE

POSTED ALONGSIDE THE NUMBER OF SERVINGS SO THAT ONE
BOWL OF CEREAL DOES NOT INADVERTENTLY TURN INTO THREE
BOWLS,

EFFECTIVELY TRIPLING

THE ALLOWABLE SUGAR CONTENT OF A ‘SMART CHOICE.’”

In addition, the FDCA requires
“[p]rominence of information on [a]
label.”44 The Act states that “if any
word, statement, or other information
required by or under authority of this Act
[that] appear[s] on the label or labeling is

not prominently placed thereon with such
conspicuousness (as compared with other
words, statements, designs, or devices, in
the labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by
the ordinary individual under customary
conditions of purchase and use” the item
will be deemed misbranded.45 The FDCA
further mandates that the “serving size
which is an amount customarily consumed
and which is expressed in a common
household measure that is appropriate to
the food” be provided on a food label.46
While the number of servings in a container is prominently posted on SCP products, the size of the serving is not. The
average consumer, however, may bypass
this pertinent information on the back of
a product when they see only FOP labeling on a SCP product. Accordingly, serving size should be posted alongside the
number of servings so that one bowl of
cereal does not inadvertently turn into
three bowls, effectively tripling the allowable sugar content of a “Smart Choice.”

is provided to the public. Since the FDA
does not have a profit-based relationship
with food companies, it may be a more
equitable rule maker for nutritional standards than is the SCP program. Since
companies must pay to be a part of the
SCP, an FDA-regulated system may also
ensure access to smaller food companies
that perhaps could not afford SCP’s benefits. Such FDA involvement may be close
in the future; Michael R. Taylor, a Senior
FDA adviser, has said that the FDA
“would consider the possibility of creating
a standardized nutrition label for the front
of packages.”47 The ideal labeling system
would address the foregoing concerns and
guide Americans to making truly
“smarter” choices. ☼

A new FDA-regulated food system
for front-of-package labeling may be the
best solution to ensure that uniform, accurate, and equitable nutritional information

‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued
Because of the abnormal delays and
inconsistent protocol used in the Plan B
switch, the district court, under the
power granted by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),28 overruled FDA’s
refusal to provide non-prescription access to Plan B to seventeen-year-old
women.29 According to § 706(2)(A) of
the APA, the court may so act when it
concludes that an agency’s findings are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law.”30 Throughout his decision,
Judge Korman was unwavering in his
opinion that the delay in FDA’s decisions
as to the supplemental new drug applications submitted by the Plan B manufacturer were a direct result of political interference, instead of being rooted in
scientific evidence.31 In addition to

“[T]HE

DELAY IN

FDA’S

DECISIONS

AS TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL NEW
DRUG APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED BY
THE

PLAN B

MANUFACTURER WERE

A DIRECT RESULT OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, INSTEAD OF BEING
ROOTED IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.”

FDA’s deviation from its routine protocol, the court also noted that Plan B is
available in most other industrialized nations without a prescription or age restriction—that is, without a BTC restriction.32
Because FDA acted inconsistently with
the scientific evidence of Plan B’s safety,
and because other scientifically advanced
countries find no problem with unre-

stricted sale of Plan B, the court surmised
that FDA’s determination that it needed
to restrict the sale of Plan B was arbitrary.33 In order to strike a balance between FDA’s concern and the citizens
who demand no point-of-sale restrictions
for the drug, the court ordered that Plan B
should be made available behind-thecounter to women age seventeen and
older.34
Opposing Views of These Roles
While Judge Korman and others view
political interference in the OTC switch of
Plan B as disgraceful, certain religious
groups and opponents of more liberal
access to the drug find Judge Korman’s
(‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued on page 10)
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‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued
decision to permit Plan B behind-thecounter sale to seventeen-year-old
women to be similarly politically driven.35
For example, Moira Gaul of the Family
Research Council finds that Judge Korman may have allowed his own personal
views to affect his decision.36 Gaul suggests that allowing the courts to decide
health-based issues diminishes FDA’s
role to manage drug regulations.37 The
Family Research Council is also concerned that easier access to the drug
could increase promiscuous behavior
among teens.38

In considering Judge Korman’s entire opinion, it seems that Gaul fails to
take into account the court’s deference to
FDA. While it is true that Judge Korman ordered the BTC sale of Plan B to
women seventeen and over without remanding that decision back to FDA,
there is no indication that this decision
lacked scientific support. The court did
not exercise extraordinary power or

make the drug available to all age groups
without a prescription; that decision was
in fact remanded to FDA.39 Thus, Gaul’s
assertion that the court’s decision was
grounded in politics seems to ignore the
scientific facts that support its decision.
Yet Gaul is not alone in her criticism
of Judge Korman’s decision. Almost
three months after Judge Korman ordered
FDA to make Plan B available to seventeen-year-olds without a prescription,
Concerned Women for American, Christian Pharmacists Fellowship International,
and Christian Medical & Dental Associations filed for leave to intervene in the
matter.40 The groups were outraged by
FDA’s decision not to appeal the March
decision and sought to assert their interest
in assessing the safety and efficacy of the
drug.41 The interveners also argued that
the decision circumvented the rulemaking
process, which would have generated the
information that they desired regarding
the drug.42 Judge Korman, however, denied the motion for leave to intervene
after the groups failed to establish standing within the proper timeframe.43 Furthermore, Judge Korman found their argument regarding FDA’s rule-making
process unpersuasive because it erroneously stated FDA’s actual policy, which
holds that rulemaking is unnecessary when
the process is initiated by a Citizen Petition (as was the case here).44

Conclusion
FDA is best equipped to evaluate the
scientific evidence objectively in order to
fulfill its mission to protect and promote
the public health, but FDA must strike a
better balance between discerning what is
medically necessary and considering certain public demands. If the FDA fails to
do so, the court should exercise the power
of review under the APA to achieve the
best possible public health outcome.
Whether activist groups agree with this
specific decision regarding Plan B, it is
reassuring to see that the system of checks
and balances reaches all areas of our federal system. Ultimately the court put the
scientific evidence first, and kept the public, rather than politics, in mind in its
decision. ☼

“FDA

IS BEST EQUIPPED TO EVALU-

ATE THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OBJECTIVELY IN ORDER TO FULFILL ITS MISSION TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE
PUBLIC HEALTH, BUT

FDA

MUST

STRIKE A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN
DISCERNING WHAT IS MEDICALLY NECESSARY AND CONSIDERING CERTAIN
PUBLIC DEMANDS.”

‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued
sumers, drug prices remain elevated until
the generic is launched. These settlement agreements help to allocate the risk
for both parties—the risk to the generic
company of losing millions in patent
infringement damages and the risk to the
brand company of losing millions in
higher priced drug sales made possible by
the lack of price competition.
Early Cases Protected Patent
Rights Despite Anti-competitive Effect
of Reverse Payments.

The fact that patent holders were
paying potential infringers raised an immediate red flag under antitrust law. Patents
by their nature create monopolies, which
antitrust law was created to eliminate.8 In
2003, the Sixth Circuit held that a reverse
payment settlement agreement was a
“horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market” and a “classic example of a per se illegal restraint on trade”
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.9
In the years that followed, however, the
Second,10 Eleventh,11 and Federal12 Circuits held that reverse payments are not an

antitrust violation. In each of these cases,
the settlement of a patent infringement
lawsuit involved the brand company paying the generic company millions of dollars in exchange for a delay in market entry of the generic drug.13
These courts reasoned that as long as
the settlement agreement neither extends
beyond the scope of the patent in term or
coverage, nor manipulates the generic
company’s 180-day exclusivity such that it
further delays other generic companies
(‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued on page 11)
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‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued
from launching drugs, reverse payments
will be upheld as lawful.14 Courts determine antitrust violations of the Sherman
Act by using the “rule of reason” analysis.15 This involves a three step approach
to determine (1) the relevant market, (2)
whether the brand company has market
power within the relevant market, and (3)
whether the reverse payments have an
adverse effect on competition in that
market.16 If all anticompetitive effects of
the settlement agreement are within the
exclusionary power of the patent, meaning the delay of market entry is within
the patent term and scope, some courts
have declined to find an antitrust violation.17 Because patent law provides an
assumption of patent validity and because public policy strongly encourages
litigation settlements, courts generally
allow reverse payments as long as the
terms of the settlement did not extend
the anti-competitive effects beyond that
“exclusionary zone” of the patent.18
Although it may appear that circuits
are split on the issue of reverse payments, it is yet to be determined whether
the Sixth Circuit will hold all reverse payments per se illegal. In the Sixth Circuit
case, the agreement involved a payment
by the brand company to the generic
company for delay of a non-infringing
drug product which would compete with
the brand name drug.19 This agreement
involved the delay of marketing a formulation of the drug that was not patent
protected but would compete with the
brand drug.20 Such an agreement would
be an antitrust violation even under the
reasoning of the Second, Eleventh, and
Federal Circuits. But the question remains as to whether the Sixth Circuit will
consider an agreement that is within the
“exclusionary zone” of a patent to be a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.
The New Administration May
Bring Changes to Reverse Payments
There has been recent legislation in
response to reverse payment settlement
agreements. The Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization

patent claims.”25 If the reverse payment
is in excess of litigation costs, and the
settlement agreement shortens the period
of patent exclusivity, the defendant can
rebut the presumption of unlawfulness
by showing that the agreed upon entry
date of the generic drug is that which
would have been expected had the patent
infringement litigation gone to judgment.26 This requires an evaluation of
the likelihood that a judgment in the
patent litigation would have resulted in
patent invalidity prior to patent expiration.27

Act (MMA) mandates that the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) receive a copy
of any settlement agreement between a
brand and generic company in a patent
infringement litigation.21 The MMA also
has safeguards against those settlement
agreements that try to manipulate and
postpone the 180-day exclusivity period
for the first generic to file a paragraph IV
certification.22 Recently, a bill has been
introduced into the Senate (S. 369) which
would amend the Clayton Act so that it
will be unlawful for anyone involved in a
patent infringement case to (1) settle for
anything of value and (2) delay use or
manufacture of the drug for a period of
time.23 This would virtually eliminate the
ability of brand and generic companies to
use reverse payments in patent litigation
settlement agreements.
In the past, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), upon invitation, has opposed certiorari in support of reverse payments.24
Recently, however, the DOJ has aligned
itself with FTC stating that reverse payments should be presumptively unlawful
because they “inappropriately permit a
patent holder to escape the risk of patent
invalidation and distort the statutory process that leads to competition in the face of

The DOJ’s model is vague and unworkable and would likely result in various interpretations among the circuits. It
would be difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether the underlying patent
would have been invalidated without a
full patent infringement trial on the merits. The current analysis by the Second,
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits allows for
a clearer set of rules for brand and generic companies to follow when determining settlement agreements. These
rules also provide a fair balance of avoiding unreasonable restraints on trade under antitrust law while allowing patent
monopolies. To date, the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari for all appealed reverse payment cases. With a
rising trend in opposition against reverse
payments, however, we may see the Supreme Court tackling this issue in the
near future. ☼

“THE DOJ’S

MODEL IS VAGUE AND

UNWORKABLE AND WOULD LIKELY
RESULT IN VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS
AMONG THE CIRCUITS.
DIFFICULT, IF NOT

IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE, TO

DETERMINE WHETHER THE UNDERLYING PATENT WOULD HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED WITHOUT A FULL PATENT
INFRINGEMENT
MERITS.”

TRIAL

ON

THE
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‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued
pharmacy services that compete with
retail pharmacies by dispensing certain
covered prescriptions directly through
the mail to patients, resulting in cost savings to patients and benefit providers.17
PBMs also provide services to monitor
and manage benefits claims, as well as
programs to educate on disease management, compliance strategies, and other
patient issues, to encourage costeffectiveness.18
Criticism of PBMs
Perhaps the biggest criticism facing
the current PBM structure is the lack of
transparency surrounding the rebates
negotiated among the parties.19 In essence, the public wants to know how big
of a “cut” the PBMs are getting. Some
argue that, armed with this information,
benefit providers and patients will wield
more bargaining power to negotiate
lower drug prices.20 In response to this
lack of transparency and regulation,
PBMs have faced state law claims of
unfair and deceptive practices brought by
private parties and claims of unfair trade
practices brought by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and many states.21 For
example, parties acting as “private attorneys general” have claimed that “PBMs
are failing to disclose and pass on” savings to benefit providers and “are contributing to the escalation in prices of
prescription drugs by keeping the lion’s
share of rebates,” which they believe “is
in the billions of dollars annually.”22 A
similar suit against Medco, brought by
the DOJ and twenty state attorneys general, was settled for $29 million.23 In
total, between 2004 and 2008, the three
largest PBMs have been subject to over
$370 million in litigation damages over
claims of “fraud; misrepresentation to
plan sponsors, patients, and providers;
unjust enrichment through secret kickback schemes; and failure to meet ethical
and safety standards.”24 Several states
have also passed legislation regulating
PBM practices, and others have considered such regulation,25 with input from
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).26
These actions all indicate that, in addition

to being subject to criticisms of the lack of
transparency generally, PBMs also suffer
due to the negative inferences that others
draw from this lack of disclosure.
The Benefits of PBMs
Despite these criticisms, PBMs have
been successful in reducing the costs of
drug benefits for their participating benefit providers, and many have found the
competition among PBMs sufficient to
compensate for the lack of transparency in
the marketplace. For example, a U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) study
found that “[t]he average price PBMs negotiated for drugs from retail pharmacies
was about 18 percent below the average
cash price customers would pay at retail
pharmacies for 14 selected brand-name
drugs and 47 percent below the average
cash price for 4 selected generic drugs.”27
Thus, the negotiating power and positioning of the PBMs in the supply chain allowed them to generate substantial savings
for patients enrolled in benefits plans as
compared to cash-paying patients.

“[T]HE

NEGOTIATING POWER AND

POSITIONING OF THE

PBMS IN THE

SUPPLY CHAIN ALLOWED THEM TO
GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS
FOR PATIENTS ENROLLED IN BENEFITS PLANS AS COMPARED TO CASH

-PAYING PATIENTS.”
Considering this and similar evidence,
government agencies previously have not
found the degree of disclosure to be inadequate because of the ample degree of
competition among PBMs. An FTC and
DOJ investigation of healthcare competition concluded that “[j]ust as competitive
forces encourage PBMs to offer their best
price and service combination to health
plan sponsors to gain access to subscribers, competition also encourages disclosure of the information health plan sponsors require to decide on the PBM with
which to contract.”28 Likewise, in a study
of PBMs that operate their own mailorder pharmacy services, the FTC deter-

mined that its “data suggest that competition in this industry can afford plan
sponsors with sufficient tools to safeguard their interests.”29 In this vein,
commentators have suggested that
“rebate transparency can be handled
through private contracts, because there
is no barrier to a plan sponsor negotiating an arrangement providing it with
access to the PBMs’ rebate information.”30 Despite these defenses of the
PBM industry, the calls for reform have
continued, including in the current debate of broad-based healthcare reform.
Current PBM Reform Efforts
Recently, legislators and consumer
groups have pushed for PBM transparency measures as part of the 2009 healthcare reform efforts partially embodied in
the Senate’s proposed America’s Healthy
Future Act (AHFA).31 The current proposal originated in an amendment sought
by Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.),32
which was approved by the Senate Finance Committee33 and incorporated
into the Senate bill.34 Under the current
Senate proposal, a PBM will be required
to confidentially disclose information on:
(1) The percentage of all prescriptions that were provided
through retail pharmacies compared to mail order pharmacies,
and the percentage of prescriptions for which a generic drug
was available and dispensed . . . . (2) The aggregate
amount, and the type of rebates, discounts, or price concessions . . . that the PBM negotiates that are attributable to
patient utilization under the
plan, and . . . that are passed
through to the plan sponsor,
and the total number of prescriptions that were dispensed.
(3) The aggregate amount of
the difference between the
amount the health benefits plan
pays the PBM and the amount
that the PBM pays retail phar(‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued on page 13)
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‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued
macies, and mail order pharmacies, and the total number of
prescriptions that were dispensed.35
The House of Representatives’ bill,
the Affordable Health Care for America
Act, incorporates similar PBM transparency provisions36 and was passed by the
House on November 7, 2009.37 Both
measures would only require transparency
and rebate disclosure, not that rebates be
passed through; however a failure to disclose would be enforced by the same penalties that apply under the Medicare rebate
statute,38 which may include $10,000 for
each day that information is not provided
or $100,000 for each item reported
falsely.39
Upon its proposal, the Cantwell
amendment was supported by over thirty
consumer, labor, and Medicare beneficiary
groups.40 These groups wrote letters urging Senate leaders to include the amendment in any final package that reaches the
Senate,41 using such language as “[n]o
other segment of the health care market
has a record of such deceptive, egregious
and anti-consumer practices.”42 This lobbying effort is further supported by the
GAO’s determination that the amendment would be budget-neutral, i.e., that
the disclosure provisions would not increase PBM costs that would be passed on
to benefit providers.43 These reform efforts reflect the lobbyists’ position that the
previous reliance on competition and contract bargaining to generate appropriate
levels of transparency has been
insufficient.
The Business of Healthcare Reform
Because of this relationship between
competition and transparency, consolidation in the PBM industry will influence
efforts at reform. In 2007, over half of all
prescriptions filled by PBMs were filled by
Medco, CVS/Caremark, or Express
Scripts.44 The consolidation continued in
2009, with Express Scripts purchasing the
PBM division of Wellpoint (the fourth
largest PBM by market share in 2007)45

and Medco reportedly leading the
bidding on the PBM
division of Aetna
(the tenth largest).46
The increased market clout and bargaining power of
PBMs in a rapidly
consolidating industry will thus influence the ultimate
benefits of any
transparency measures.
In addition,
apart from transparency measures incorporated into any healthcare reform legislation that is passed, the PBMs will directly
benefit from the expected increase in access to medical insurance. Robert Hodgson, the manager of the BlackRock
Healthcare Fund, expects PBMs in particular among healthcare sectors to benefit
from the AHFA: “Someone is going to
have to be responsible for managing the
drug [expenditures], helping people get
the best prices, helping [do] things by
mail, helping—whether it’s the HMOs or
whether it’s a government-run plan—put
those packages and those programs together.”47 In other words, PBMs will play
the same role in the pharmaceutical supply
chain post-reform, but with an expanded,
and potentially more profitable, scope.
Creating a Win-Win for Big Business and Small Patient
With increased consolidation and
expanded access to their services, PBMs
stand to profit significantly in the near
future. For instance, fewer PBMs should
give the survivors increased bargaining
power to negotiate better rebates from
pharmaceutical manufacturers.48
The
increased market size will also expand the
role of PBM services in containing costs
and managing formularies, reinforcing
their additional bargaining power. It
should also increase demand for effective
ancillary services like mail-order pharmacies, claims adjudication, and quality-

focused programs, for which PBMs earn
additional administrative fees. Even if
the additional transparency requirements
result in lower margins, this would be
offset by higher volume. Accordingly,
given the scope of the expected market
expansion, it is likely that PBMs will ultimately benefit from healthcare reform.
Nonetheless, it is clearly patients and
benefit providers who are intended to
benefit from the Cantwell amendment’s
transparency measures. Transparency
should be the price exacted—the tradeoff—for the PBMs’ increased role in the
marketplace. As advocates have argued,
“A market needs three things to function
competitively and effectively: choice,
transparency, and lack of a conflict of
interest.”49 If, as many expect, disclosure
result in lower prices, this will be an immediate benefit for these groups to the
extent that disclosure increases the size
of the rebate that is passed on to them
without increasing the prices paid by the
PBMs. “If PBMs reduce drug prices, it’s
possible—depending on their health plan
and the company they work for—that
some patients might pay less for
drugs.”50 Yet despite the GAO’s determination that the measure is “budget
neutral,”51 the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association lobbying group and
some PBM executives believe the
amendment will actually increase prescription drug costs, because it would
(Managing PBMs,’ Continued on page 14)
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‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued
give manufacturers and pharmacies more
leverage in the negotiation of pricing,
reducing the margins realized by the
PBMs.52
Whatever the immediate impact of
the Cantwell or similar amendments on
drug prices may be, patients and benefit
providers still stand to benefit from the
effect of healthcare reform on the PBM
industry. For example, transparency
should also promote savings by reducing
the need to “litigate challenges to egregious, deceptive and anticompetitive
PBM conduct.”53 Benefit providers have
also followed the lead of Congress by
taking immediate action and lobbying
PBMs themselves, with nearly sixty large
employers banding together to demand
greater transparency from PBMs54 via the
previously favored private contracting
method.55 Finally, even in the event that
drug prices increase incrementally, a large
number of patients—formerly cash payors and now members of PBM-managed

plans under the AHFA reforms—will still
see their drug prices fall by as much as
fifty percent.56

edly, the result of this reform would be a
mutually beneficial relationship, and the
foundation of this mutually beneficial
relationship will be transparency. ☼

None of these secondary benefits
should overshadow the ultimate goal and
likely consequence of the transparency
measures: to pass more of the rebate savings along to drug purchasers. Ultimately,
this transparency measure, when incorporated into the broader healthcare reform
initiative, would benefit both big business
and small patient. Pharmacy benefit managers are good at what they do—
negotiating the middle of the pharmaceutical supply chain to bring savings to benefit providers and patients.
Congress
should leverage this expertise and ensure
that healthcare reform provides access to
PBMs and increased rebate savings for all
patients. In exchange, enlarging the role
of PBMs in the healthcare marketplace
will provide significant new profit-making
opportunities for the industry, which investors are already recognizing. Undoubt-

‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued
Full disclosure of an error includes a
description of the error, an acknowledgement of responsibility, and an apology.34
But a careful choice of words may be
used to subvert this disclosure by not
informing the patient of the actual error
that occurred and the full extent of the
effect on his or her health.35 Another
study estimated that nationwide, physicians are only disclosing errors to patients about one-third of the time.36
These studies demonstrate the great disconnect between the ideals that support
error disclosure and its actual performance.
Reasons for Non-disclosure of
Errors
The psychological underpinnings
that cause physicians to resist disclosing
medical errors to patients are complex
and can be traced to the basic structure

of medical training:
Admission of errors is difficult
for physicians. Historically physicians in residency training have
trained in a culture where disclosure to peers is considered a sign
of weakness. Instead skill in
“roundsmanship” is valued, that

“CONSEQUENTLY, THIS ‘[MEDICAL]
NARCISSISM’ CREATES A SIGNIFICANT
PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER IN ALLOWING PHYSICIANS TO ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT THEY COULD HAVE COMMITTED
AN ERROR, WHICH IN TURN LEADS TO
THE ‘PHENOMENON OF MEDICAL ERROR CONCEALMENT’ AND OTHER EFFORTS TO OBSCURE THE OCCURRENCE
AND FACTS RELATED TO THE ERROR.”

is, creative and contemporaneous
responses to cover deficiencies
or errors when reporting to more
senior physicians.37
“Medical narcissism” is defined as the
need of health professionals to preserve
their self esteem leading to the compromise of error disclosure to patients.38
Additionally, there is “an atmosphere in
health care that can breed narcissistic inclinations and attitudes that make it very
difficult to disclose medical errors truthfully and ethically.”39 Consequently, this
“narcissism” creates a significant psychological barrier in allowing physicians to
acknowledge that they could have committed an error, which in turn leads to the
“phenomenon of medical error concealment” and other efforts to obscure the
occurrence and facts related to the error.40
The “rationalizing” of errors by medical
professionals is another mechanism
(‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued on page 15)
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“Yes, we disclose. . . .”

© Neatly Chiseled Features, used with permission

whereby the significance of the error is
minimized by terming it as an “incident,”
by stating that it did not conclusively
result in harm to the patient, and, if harm
did occur, that it was minimal and not
“anybody’s fault.”41

reporting.45

The primary factor that is widely
understood to limit full error disclosure is
a fear of resultant medical malpractice
lawsuits.42 A landmark study suggested,
however, that non-disclosure of errors is
more likely to lead patients to change
physicians and seek legal advice regarding
the errors.43 In contrast to patients reporting that error disclosure would be
unlikely to lead them to sue for medical
malpractice are the results of recent financial risk analyses using mathematical
modeling to evaluate the financial risks
associated with error disclosure. While
conceding that disclosure of medical errors is “the ethically right thing to do,”
the authors of the study concluded that
disclosing errors would likely prompt
patients to sue, resulting in increases in
medical malpractice costs.44 Nonetheless,
it is questionable whether a desire to
avoid financial responsibility for mistakes
is a valid basis for abandoning an ethical
obligation.

In 1999, an Institute of Medicine
publication reported that as many as
ninety-eight thousand Americans die in
hospitals each year as a result of medical
error.46 Viewed in the context of the significant biases that afflict voluntary reporting of adverse events, these statistics
may have represented an underreporting.47 Since the publication of this
report, issues of patient safety and medical
error reporting have received a great deal
of attention from the medical community.

Other significant factors contributing to non-disclosure include concerns
about loss of reputation and referrals, the
desire of physicians to remain selfregulated, and the fear of retribution for

While there are many reasons
for non-disclosure of errors, none of these
negate the basic ethical imperative for
disclosure.
Possible Effects of the PSA

The effects of legal mandates on
medical error disclosure and eventually
patient safety are yet to be fully understood. In theory, the PSA should result in
an increase in the number of error disclosures to patients and to DHHS. There
may be no effective way, however, of validating that this is indeed occurring. Certain occurrences fall within well-defined
classifications of “serious preventable
adverse events,” such as burns sustained
by a patient while undergoing surgery or
errors in blood transfusions.48 Other
“incidents,” such as the one described
above where a patient dies following attempts to suction blood from around the
heart, may be “rationalized” as “no one’s

fault.”49 Truly egregious errors are likely
to go unreported due to concerns of liability and fears of negative publicity following reporting to DHSS. Hence, in the
absence of independent monitoring, the
mandated disclosure of errors will not
necessarily ensure the compliance of
healthcare providers and hospitals.
Conclusions
The creation of a law requiring disclosure of medical errors in New Jersey
indicates that the legislature does not consider valid any reasons put forward for
non-disclosure. Data collected through
the mandatory reporting system can identify the factors that lead to medical errors
and in turn eliminate or minimize these
factors as far as feasible. Additionally,
patients are provided information to make
informed choices about future medical
care. The effect that this law will have on
the frequency of medical malpractice suits
remains debatable.50 Enactment of the
PSA is a significant step toward mandating transparency in healthcare. Whether a
law can truly bring about the desired
transparency and result in improved patient safety remains to be seen. ☼

“WHILE

THERE ARE MANY REASONS

FOR NON-DISCLOSURE OF ERRORS,
NONE OF THESE NEGATE THE BASIC
ETHICAL
DISCLOSURE.”

IMP ERATIVE

FOR
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Health Law Forum News
The NY Health and Hospital Corporation
Newark, NJ—October 5, 2009

On October 5, 2009, the Health Law Forum hosted
guest speaker Stacy-Ann Christian, J.D., M.P.H., who
discussed her role as the Senior Director of the Office of
Clinical and Health Services Research at the New York City
Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC). As part of the
Health Law Forum’s ongoing speaker series, Stacy-Ann
Christian spoke at length about her current work and the
many capacities it entails including lawyer, administrator,
policy expert, and businesswoman.
Ms. Christian provided a brief overview about her
educational and professional background. After law school,
she first clerked for an Essex County judge and then entered
private practice. Upon completion of her Master of Public
Health degree, she went in-house at a pharmaceutical
company. After obtaining extensive contracting experience,
Ms. Christian joined HHC. At HHC, she is responsible for
managing all legal and contractual aspects of pharmaceutical
and medical device studies conducted at the thirteen hospital
and healthcare facilities that are part of HHC. Ms. Christian
described how such wide-ranging responsibility entails the
ability to understand the human and business aspects of
research contract negotiations; on one end are the research
subjects, who are typically uninsured or underinsured and
whom HHC is charged with serving, and on the other is the
need to advance research and ensure that HHC is able to
receive funding so that it can continue to provide its services.
Ms. Christian finally discussed her experience obtaining
the M.P.H. degree, particularly noting that the team-based
teaching method broadened her highly technical and
analytical law-school thinking processes. At the same time,
she explained that having her law degree helped her analyze
public health problems in a more practical matter than some
of her counterparts in the degree program. She further
noted that the M.P.H. has been highly marketable, providing
opportunities to pursue a career spanning both policy and
law.
The Health Law Forum would like to thank Ms.
Christian for taking the time to speak about her experiences
and for providing advice and opportunities in the field. The
Health Law Forum is proud to work in partnership with
such a valuable health law resource. ☼

HLF Director of Online
Development Jordan
Cohen (left) and HLF
Vice President Matt
McKennan (right) welcome incoming health
law students at new
student orientation in
August. Copies of the
Health Law Outlook
were distributed to
new 1Ls, who frequently contribute to
the HLO in their first
semester.

Launch of the Health Law Forum Website
The Health Law Forum is excited to announce the launch of
our website: www.healthlawforum.com. This site is entirely student
-run and serves as a hub to both the Health Law Forum and the
Health Law Outlook. At the site you can find all of the previous
Health Law Outlook publications, as well as a calendar of the Health
Law Forum’s future events. We continuously update the site with
information, including outlines for classes related to health law,
links to other health law-related websites and blogs, and discussions and summaries of Health Law Forum events as they occur
throughout the semester. Our hope is that the site will foster student collaboration and discussion, as well as networking opportunities in the field of health law. ☼

www.HealthLawForum.com
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More HLF News
One of many panel discussions
at the Student Health Law
Newark, NJ—October 16, 2009
On Friday, October 16, 2009, Seton Hall Law hosted the Third Annual Student Health Law Conference.
Conference. The conference was co-sponsored by Seton Hall Law and the American Society of
Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME). Students from law schools across the country attended the day
-long event to explore career opportunities in the field of health law. Associate Dean Kathleen
Boozang kicked off the conference with an entertaining and far-reaching explanation about the
scope of a health lawyer’s responsibilities. Her introduction touched on the role of corporate
counsel at non-profit hospitals, issues of fraud and abuse encountered by government attorneys,
and the role of lawyers in international health policy debates involving healthcare provision under a
totalitarian regime.

Student Health Law Conference

Soon after Dean Boozang’s charge, students attended various panels throughout the Seton
Hall Law campus. Each panel was composed of distinguished professionals in the health law field,
including several Seton Hall alumni. Practitioners from various organizations and institutions including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Gibbons P.C., Johnson & Johnson,
and Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey provided career advice and guidance. The panel sessions
covered such topics as Pharmaceutical In-house Counsel, Health Information Technology, Starting
Your Own Health Law Related Business, and Obtaining an L.L.M. in health law.
Each panel session included a brief overview by the panelists about their journey and experience in health law. Panelists also
fielded questions from students. Common questions included topics such as how to get your “foot in the door”, whether or not a
scientific background is helpful in the pursuit of health law, and what areas of health law are emerging or bound for growth in the
future. Panelists offered a broad range of suggestions and valuable insight. For instance, the panel of in-house counsel recommended, as a practical matter, working in a private firm or government position before making the transition in-house. The panel
regarding government enforcement stressed internships at local levels and the potentially tremendous impact of federal regulation
reform on future practice. Overall, the panel discussions illuminated the viability of a health law career even during a shaky economic climate due primarily to the growing breadth of health-related laws and regulations at both the state and federal level. The day
ended with one final opportunity to meet fellow students, faculty, and panelists during a networking reception in the Seton Hall Law
Atrium.
Overall, the conference was an overwhelming success. As evidenced by
the quality, number, and diversity of panelists and students in attendance,
the program provided an excellent opportunity to explore the field of
health law and to meet current and future colleagues across the spectrum
of health law practice. ☼

Blood Drive

Newark, NJ—October 13, 2009

Conference attendees mingle at the networking reception in the law school atrium.

The fall semester blood drive was a tremendous success, thanks to
volunteers from the Public Interest Network and the Health Law Forum.
The drive was organized by HLF secretary Nicole Ho and was sponsored
by the American Red Cross. Students donated in the Multipurpose
Room of the law school and were treated to snacks and beverages. The
fifty-one donations will help save 153 lives. Please join us when the Red
Cross returns again next semester for the spring semester blood drive. ☼
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Health Law Forum News
About the Health Law Forum
The Health Law Forum is a student organization at
Seton Hall Law School for those interested in health
law.
The Health Law Forum hosts speakers, panel discussions, community service projects, and networking
events throughout each academic year.
The Health Law Outlook (HLO), a subsidiary of the
Health Law Forum for students interested in health policy, hosts regular round-table discussions about current
topics in the healthcare field. Each semester, HLO presents healthcare issues using debate, brain-storming,
presentation, and Socratic method formats. Many of the
articles included in newsletters are the product of these
meetings and discussion.
This semester’s HLO and HLF meetings and events
included
Speaker discussing the roles attorneys play in the
coordination of research studies in hospitals and
other healthcare organizations.

Seton Hall University School of Law
Health Law Forum

Health Law Outlook

HLF 2009-2010 Executive Board:
Matthew Colford (3L), President
Matthew McKennan (2L), Vice President
Kaitlin Semler (3L), Treasurer
Nicole Ho (3L), Secretary
Jordan Cohen (2L), Dir. Online Devel.
Sarah Geers (3L), Co-VP, HLO
Maansi Raswant (2L), Co-VP, HLO

Analysis of the current H1N1 pandemic, including
its impact on a global, national, and regional level.

Timothy Norton (3L), HLO Editor

Fall blood drive, co-sponsored by the Public Interest
Network.

Stephanie Mazzaro (1L), SBA Rep.

Faculty discussion regarding student course selection
for next semester.
Launch of the new Health Law Forum website.

Renee Levine (1L), SBA Rep.

Faculty Advisor:
Professor Carl Coleman
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Visit our website at www.HealthLawForum.com
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